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David Cameron’s decision to call a referendum on the EU was the result of intense Eurosceptic pressures from both
within and outside his party. He found himself with little scope for manoeuvre as Ukip gained support and his
backbenchers threatened rebellion. Pascal D König looks at what a competition theory usually applied to business
can reveal about his misjudgment and eventual replacement as PM.
Eurosceptics to the right of him … Michael Gove, who campaigned to Leave the EU, with David Cameron in
2010. Photo: Number 10 via a CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 licence
Businesses have a tricky relationship with their suppliers. Generally, they prefer to keep them at arm’s length and
avoid giving them too much influence, because too much dependence on a single supplier is risky. If that supplier
becomes aware it is indispensable, it may be able to dictate the terms of the relationship or even threaten a
business by putting up its prices.
But supplier influence is only one of the competitive forces acting on a business. The management theorist Michael
Porter identified five of them:
• suppliers’ bargaining power
• customers’ bargaining power
• the threat of substitutes
• the threat of new entrants
• the intensity of rivalry in the market, which is influence by the other four.
Porter originally conceived this as a framework for analysing the level of competition within an industry, though it
can also be used to develop a strategy to successfully position a product in a market. However, it is also possible to
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identify these forces at work in the realm of party competition. In the Conservative party under David Cameron, their
conjunction brought about a complex competitive environment – an environment in which ideational suppliers
were pivotal.
The Conservatives faced a threat from a newly-popular competitor, Ukip. Over time different means and policies
emerge to tackle political issues – take, for example, monetarism replacing Keynesianism as a paradigm in
economic policy. The customers – here, the voters – exert additional pressure if elections are close, there is a clear
majority behind certain policies or they can threaten backward integration, which in politics would mean they have
direct democratic means to take things into their own hands.
Suppliers in the area of party politics can take various forms. Parties are often traditionally tied to certain ideational
suppliers, such as associations, trade unions and churches. They may also depend on influential supporter groups,
activists and sponsors, which can constrain the party leadership.
Finally, party rivalry is considerable, and raises the stakes for parties to invest in an issue where no party is clearly
more competitive and where voters are volatile and available, i.e. do not take a principled stance on something.
In politics, enjoying a competitive advantage means being perceived as more credible, competent and committed
than others, and sustaining that impression. As competition increases, the effort needed to achieve and sustain
competitiveness rises too. Looking at parties striving for a competitive advantage against the backdrop of the five
forces can help to make sense of the developments that led up to Brexit and its aftermath.
Setting the scene
The foundations for Brexit and Cameron’s resignation were laid during the financial crisis. During that period,
financial and economic policy – as well as immigration policy – became strongly intertwined with European Union
politics. The financial crisis suddenly put economic issues at the top of the political agenda; immigration gradually
replaced them there.
As Cameron implemented austerity policies, his government deliberately distanced itself from the EU. The
latter made an easy scapegoat in the light of its handling of the Eurocrisis, and the British government witnessed a
serious of policies on the EU level (such as the Two Pack, the so-called Sixpack and the Fiscal Compact) that
put constraints on countries’ financial autonomy – and from which the UK opted out where it was concerned (as in
the Fiscal Compact). Under these circumstances, the idea that Britain could sort out the crisis by itself,
unconstrained by the EU and without sharing the burden of other EU members, gained currency – perhaps even
more so as British austerity paradoxically looked very much like the Eurozone austerity model. As Marc Vail has
argued, intra-party pressure and the threat from Ukip created incentives to complement an economic policy of strict
austerity with vilifying the EU. According to Vail, the Cameron government demonised “the EU as an existential
threat to Britain’s national sovereignty and an institutionalised threat to Britain’s economic well-being”. Economic
policy and the stance towards the EU were interwoven.
It therefore became hard to keep economic and financial policy separate from the issue of EU relations. The
question of the right policy solution became linked to the question of how and whether to stay in the EU – and so
alternative policy paths towards prosperity emerged. Moreover, the idea of economic nationalism was strengthened,
which played into the hands of Eurosceptic Conservatives. For them, the relationship with the EU is not only a
question of British identity, but also about opportunity – or the sovereignty – to pursue a better economic
development path.
In 2011, the Prime Minister was already under pressure from Conservative MPs who were calling for referendum on
EU membership. In their view, the UK had surrendered too many powers to the EU, which was seen as bloated,
wasteful, over-regulated and a barrier to economic growth. In 2015 a newly-formed group of 50 Conservatives
demanded major concessions from Cameron’s renegotiations with the EU. The Tory MP Steve Baker, who led the
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group, warned that the government would only be supported as long as he obtained political independence from
Europe, more freedom from regulation and a greater ability to trade freely.
Certainly, Eurosceptic Conservatives were influential before the crisis, with a long-standing and extensive network. A
Eurosceptic consensus had been growing since the mid-2000s. However, their ideas and agenda became more
important as austerity took hold. Euroscepticism was a relatively marginal issue before, but the developments during
the financial crisis put it at the centre of party politics, and the question of EU membership was openly debated.
As John FitzGibbon has identified, the Tory Eurosceptic network not only extends well beyond their MPs, but
stretches beyond party lines and even encompasses financial supporters and the media. This gave them the ability
to mobilise support outside of parliament. It also meant that they could, under certain circumstances, be in a
position to bypass the party leadership formulation of policies – or as it is put in management theory, threaten
forward integration.
While economic and financial issues were still high on the political agenda, the issue of immigration gradually rose in
importance and demanded policy responses from the government. At the same time, immigration – in part combined
with law and order – became tied to EU affairs, as many migrants had come to Britain when their countries joined
the EU. As the combination of anti-immigration sentiment and Euroscepticism were becoming more popular, Ukip
rose in the polls, putting additional pressure on the Cameron government.
How Cameron dealt with an intricate competitive situation
The Cameron government thus found itself in a difficult situation. Solutions to immigration and the financial
crisis were increasingly hard to separate from the question of European integration. Competing merely on economic
policy, for example, was not enough. To be truly competitive, it needed to signal competent and credible handling of
EU affairs. Ukip was threatening the Conservatives not just on immigration, but also through its emphasis on
economic nationalism and independence. Pressure also came from within Cameron’s own party, with Eurosceptic
Conservatives playing an important role as an ideational supplier and thus effectively constraining Cameron’s scope
for strategic decisions.
Then came the 2014 European Parliament elections, in which Ukip could – and did – achieve major success, having
already made considerable gains in the 2013 local elections. Voter influence in terms of sanctioning potential was
high, and Ukip was threatening to enter Parliament. Finally, while party rivalry is generally intense in the majoritarian
and adversarial British political system, the 2010-15 coalition government and the relatively close majority after the
2015 general election meant additional competitive pressures.
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Calling a referendum under these circumstances was a way to deal with these threats. It allowed Cameron to signal
commitment and credibility in the issues of immigration and political and economic sovereignty from the EU. He
basically tried to play voters against internal critics, which could have removed the EU from the top of the agenda
again.
However, this move only bought Cameron more time, ensuring that voters would have a strong influence over EU
affairs at a later stage. Moreover, his gamble ensured immigration and austerity/economic issues became even
more closely associated with European integration – also visible in the 2015 Conservative manifesto, which
promised to scrap the Human Rights Act and restrict benefits for EU migrants. As the referendum date came closer,
it became more and more clear that neither side enjoyed overwhelming support among the electorate. At the same
time, Cameron was in a tough competitive position. The Conservatives could hardly be presented as credible and
committed supporters of the Remain position, particularly with Eurosceptic Conservatives and their supporters
launching their own campaign. Other parties, while they also had splits on the EU issue within their ranks, were in a
better position. The hard Eurosceptics and Brexiteers in Cameron’s own party made it virtually impossible for him to
credibly take a pro-EU stance, which in turn meant it was harder for him to appear credible on immigration and the
economy.
His previous strategic decisions thus limited Cameron’s ability to present himself as a party leader with a distinctive
and competitive stance on the EU. Only after the referendum result did the Conservatives adopt a very clear stance,
even showing a readiness for a hard Brexit. By becoming the party of Brexit and of “putting Britain first”, it could
regain credibility. Cameron’s gamble, which is perhaps far from having reached its conclusion, thus led to a partial
rebranding of the Conservatives. The party strengthened its association with economic nationalism and control over
immigration – certainly an image and reputation that other parties can hardly achieve and challenge now.
While they now seem to enjoy a competitive advantage on those issues, the Conservatives will have to prove that
their solutions continue to deserve support. Moreover, they risk ending up having a competitive advantage in an
area – a market segment – that is popular with a declining number of voters.
This post represents the views of the author and not those of Democratic Audit.
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